Tuesday, February 24, 2009

The Formula That Killed Wall Street


This is very good look at a central aspect of the MBS (mortgage backed securities) ratings alchemy. How do you turn subprime slope into AAA gems. Look inside the black box with this article.

A "quant" came up with a mathematical model that supposedly drastically reduced or even eliminated risk (at least that is how it was interpreted by the bankers). Banks used the model to lever up to the moon. The whole thing fell apart in less than 10 years and the model's deficiencies were dramatically exposed. Where have we heard this story before? Several generations ago… far enough back that no one remembers it? Of course not. It was only last decade when the quants at Long Term Capital Management started the hedge fund based on their own risk-crushing model of bond arbitrage. And they levered up. And in less than 5 years, the hedge fund imploded right down on top of the model, the fund's partners, and its investors. Déjà vu all over again.

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Thursday, February 19, 2009

Our Ponzi Banking System


“Give me a lever big enough and a place to stand on and I will destroy the world.”

Oh, wait. That’s not exactly what Archimedes said. Of course, Archimedes never dreamed of the kind of ingenuity alchemy that would be practiced by our modern financial “wizards.” All they needed was a minuscule amount of capital and a lever arm so long it bent under its own weight.

I found a good intro. to bank leverage at Option ARMageddon. The first installment provides 2008 Q3 bank leverage calculations along with a discussion of how dangerous such leverage is. There are a couple of shorter follow-up posts here and here. The leverage calculations were recently updated for Q4 here. As the posts point out, these leverage numbers are likely to be conservative because they don’t account for “other assets” or off-balance sheet assets (e.g., special investment vehicles). Yet the numbers are still scary large.

In the “good” times, a bank with a 30x lever would make a 150% return on equity when its assets appreciated by just 5%. But now that the bill for this unsustainable leveraged credit bubble has come due, this same bank would be insolvent if its assets dropped by just 5%. And the collateral that is behind much of these assets has obviously fallen by far more than 5%. As these losses become actualized by the foreclosing housing market and a tanking economy, the pressure will mount on the bank to mark these assets to market (i.e., what the market is willing to pay for them today) instead of marking them to model (i.e., what the bank’s management optimistically thinks the assets would be worth in a stable and only slightly depressed market) thus exposing the bankruptcy of the bank’s business model. Since a 30x bank can only absorb a small portion of the losses, the rest of the losses must go elsewhere. And since the other big banks are also levered up with these tanking assets, they can’t deal with their own slop much less take on more slop.

This means that you (the taxpayers) get to bail out the guys who were getting crazy rich from the lever arm in the up years. You never saw any of these bonuses, of course, but you will certainly see the losses. They received the 30x profits but you’ll get much of the 30x losses. Our government will ensure this in order to avoid the cascading cross defaults that would result if these banks were to begin falling. When Lehman went down, the financial markets nearly ground to a catastrophic halt as Lehman’s levered losses threatened to bring down its numerous counterparties and credit default swaps (insurance contracts taken out on financial instruments such as bonds that pay out if and only if the instrument defaults) on Lehman’s debt were triggered that crushed AIG (which was also heavily leveraged with very little capital and huge credit default swap obligations). The government and the Fed had no choice but to jump in and stop this massive domino pattern from erupting (whether or not their actions were the best of the available options is another matter).

But as the latest numbers show, the banking system is still highly leveraged. The more the economy falls, the crappier these bank assets will become. It hardly looks like we’ve found the bottom yet. The scary scenario is this: the leveraged debt bubble is so big that even if the Fed prints money with both hands flailing, it still wouldn’t be enough to fill the credit black hole as it implodes. I don’t know how likely this is but the banks’ balance (and off-balance) sheets don’t inspire confidence.

Obviously there is nothing “free market” about a system predicated upon dumping huge economic externalities onto the rest of the economy and especially onto taxpayers (i.e., the banking version of an industry-wide pollution racket designed to lower the costs of production). The gains were all privatized while most of the risks and costs were socialized. Even apart from our fiat currency or the usual Fed manipulation of money and credit, the free market was dead in the banking sector years before the first bailout.

Bernie Madoff was a lightweight. Unlike our ponzi banking system, his puny $50B scheme was never a threat to bring down the entire world financial market.

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Monday, February 16, 2009

Europe's Monetary Stalingrad


Germany's economy is tanking while the German government is having trouble raising funds.

Meanwhile, Ambrose Evans-Pritchard is not in an optimistic mood:

Failure to save East Europe will lead to worldwide meltdown

Austria's finance minister Josef Pröll made frantic efforts last week to put together a €150bn rescue for the ex-Soviet bloc. Well he might. His banks have lent €230bn to the region, equal to 70pc of Austria's GDP.

"A failure rate of 10pc would lead to the collapse of the Austrian financial sector," reported Der Standard in Vienna. Unfortunately, that is about to happen.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) says bad debts will top 10pc and may reach 20pc. The Vienna press said Bank Austria and its Italian owner Unicredit face a "monetary Stalingrad" in the East.

[…]

Not even Russia can easily cover the $500bn dollar debts of its oligarchs while oil remains near $33 a barrel. The budget is based on Urals crude at $95. Russia has bled 36pc of its foreign reserves since August defending the rouble.

"This is the largest run on a currency in history," said Mr Jen.

In Poland, 60pc of mortgages are in Swiss francs. The zloty has just halved against the franc. Hungary, the Balkans, the Baltics, and Ukraine are all suffering variants of this story. As an act of collective folly – by lenders and borrowers – it matches America's sub-prime debacle. There is a crucial difference, however. European banks are on the hook for both. US banks are not.

Almost all East bloc debts are owed to West Europe, especially Austrian, Swedish, Greek, Italian, and Belgian banks. En plus, Europeans account for an astonishing 74pc of the entire $4.9 trillion portfolio of loans to emerging markets.

They are five times more exposed to this latest bust than American or Japanese banks, and they are 50pc more leveraged (IMF data).

Spain is up to its neck in Latin America, which has belatedly joined the slump (Mexico's car output fell 51pc in January, and Brazil lost 650,000 jobs in one month). Britain and Switzerland are up to their necks in Asia.

Whether it takes months, or just weeks, the world is going to discover that Europe's financial system is sunk, and that there is no EU Federal Reserve yet ready to act as a lender of last resort or to flood the markets with emergency stimulus.

[…]

The sums needed are beyond the limits of the IMF, which has already bailed out Hungary, Ukraine, Latvia, Belarus, Iceland, and Pakistan – and Turkey next – and is fast exhausting its own $200bn (€155bn) reserve. We are nearing the point where the IMF may have to print money for the world, using arcane powers to issue Special Drawing Rights.

Its $16bn rescue of Ukraine has unravelled. The country – facing a 12pc contraction in GDP after the collapse of steel prices – is hurtling towards default, leaving Unicredit, Raffeisen and ING in the lurch. Pakistan wants another $7.6bn. Latvia's central bank governor has declared his economy "clinically dead" after it shrank 10.5pc in the fourth quarter. Protesters have smashed the treasury and stormed parliament.


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Asia In Trouble


Japan's GDP fell 12.7% in Q4 while the rest of Asia is in an export free fall.

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Friday, February 13, 2009

Just Say 'No' to Monetary Fascism


The popular uprising against central banking

http://www.amconmag.com/article/2009/feb/09/00016/

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Wednesday, February 11, 2009

The Home as ATM


Federal Reserve economists Alan Greenspan and James Kennedy produced two papers [1] [2] in recent years that analyze some trends in US mortgages. Since then, they have adjusted and updated their analysis [3]. Among other things, they looked at equity extraction – the amount of home equity that was converted into liquid funds by US homeowners. Gross equity extraction, or mortgage equity withdrawal (MEW) as it is also termed, is defined as equity extracted due to home sales (first mortgages minus the debt paid off due to the sale) plus cash out due to refinancing of first mortgages plus the change in home equity loans net of any unscheduled payments on first mortgages. Net MEW is gross MEW minus costs associated with the equity extraction such as closing costs. Net mortgage equity withdrawal is the stored value that homeowners removed from their houses and converted into cash in order to make various purchases, provide funds for investments, or to payoff non-mortgage debt.

An interesting thing happens when we compare their net MEW numbers with GDP for the US economy [4]. Because the home equity we are looking at here was liquidated and spent, it showed up in the calculation of GDP (see a caveat to this statement below). If the equity had not been extracted, however, it would not have impacted the GDP. It would still be there in the various homes as equity. Thus, we can compare real GDP growth as it has been reported [5] with real GDP growth minus net MEW. In this way, we can get a good idea of how GDP would have changed if US homeowners had not extracted equity from there homes. We can also look for any changes in the comparison over time.

The following chart presents the comparison of real GDP change and real GDP w/o net MEW.




There are several interesting points to this chart. First, the overall impression is that MEW has been a significant part of the official measure of economic growth for years. Second, we can note that MEW has had an increasing impact on real GDP since roughly 1996. From 1991 to 1995, new MEW added about 1% to the growth of GDP. But in 1996 and 1997, the impact grew to about 1.5%. After 1997, the impact of MEW on GDP grew until, by 2004, net MEW was contributing 6.5% to the change in GDP. Since 2004, net MEW has declined and with it, the GDP. The third point we can note is probably the most obvious. Had it not been for sizable amounts of equity extraction, the US economy, as measured by real GDP, would have contracted every year since the last recession. And with drops of 1.5-3.5% per year, we’re talking about a significant contraction.

There is one caveat that I’d make here. Some of the free cash generated by the equity withdrawals was used to make investments such as stock and bond purchases. While some investments directly show up in GDP (e.g., art or precious metal purchases), the purchase of financial instruments such as stocks and bonds are not counted in GDP. The investments listed by Greenspan and Kennedy are not distinguished by source so there is no way to tell what showed up in GDP and what did not. However even if we assume that none of the investments showed up in GDP, investment as a category explains no more than a moderate portion of MEW. Moreover, the percent of extracted free cash that went into investments consistently declined over the period in question. In addition, the purchase of financial instruments does have some indirect impact on GDP. All this is to say that for the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that all of net MEW showed up in GDP. This overstates somewhat the affect of MEW on GDP and makes the chart look a little more dramatic than actual events would warrant but I don’t think the error is large. Absent net MEW, we would still be left with a falling GDP throughout this decade.

So to put it bluntly, US homeowners have been using their houses as ATMs. The equity they withdrew fostered the illusion that our economy was healthy and growing. But the spending growth was not fueled by new savings that was invested to increase production. Instead, current assets were leveraged and consumed to fuel the GDP. In some cases, the assets were realized capital gains (such as home sales) but in other cases, the gains were unrealized (such as home equity loans). And now that the housing market has been crushed, this fire hose of funds has been reduced to a trickling garden hose at most. With few exceptions, net MEW was $150B-$200B per quarter from 2005 to Q2 2007. Since then, net MEW has tanked as follows [6]:

Q3 2007: $119.3B
Q4 2007: $92.3B
Q1 2008: $51.2B
Q2 2008: $9.5B
Q3 2008: -$64.1B

And judging by the hit that the US housing market has taken, it will be some time before it's even possible for mortgage equity withdrawal to be a significant player in GDP again. Perhaps now we’ll begin to realize that leveraging and consuming assets is not the path to sustained economic growth.


Notes

[1] Estimates of Home Mortgage Originations, Repayments, and Debt On One-to-Four Family Residences, Sept. 2005, http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2005/200541/200541pap.pdf

[2] Sources and Uses of Equity Extracted from Homes, March 2007, http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/200720/200720pap.pdf

[3] http://beacheconomist.com/documents/Kennedy-Greenspanequityextractiondata2007Q2.xls

[4] The idea for this comparison came from John Mauldin (http://www.frontlinethoughts.com/pdf/mwo101708.pdf). There is a consistent difference between his calculation of how MEW impacts GDP and my results. I show a bigger affect of MEW on GDP for each year that our charts have in common. However the respective overall points as well as the diachronic trends displayed by our charts are the same. I have contacted Mauldin’s company to ask about the difference but have not heard back from him.

[5] GDP data retrieved from http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp

[6] The most recent data came from the following sources:
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2007/12/q3-mortgage-equity-withdrawal-133.html
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2008/03/q4-mortgage-equity-withdrawal-76.html
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2008/06/q1-2008-mortgage-equity-withdrawal-512.html
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2008/10/q2-2008-mortgage-equity-withdrawal.html
http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2008/12/q3-2008-mortgage-equity-extraction.html

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Tuesday, February 10, 2009

There is No Paradox of Thrift


http://mises.org/story/3064

Frank Shostak on why the paradox of thrift/deleveraging is no paradox at all. Economies bloated with hot air (i.e., phony, leveraged credit) need to deflate and save. The real paradox is how otherwise intelligent people can think that a leveraged, debt-ridden country with dwindling savings can fix its economic problems with more debt and spending.

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1,000 CCs of Statism, Stat!


Ruin Your Health With the Obama Stimulus Plan
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601039&refer=columnist_mccaughey&sid=aLzfDxfbwhzs

[…]

But the bill goes further. One new bureaucracy, the National Coordinator of Health Information Technology, will monitor treatments to make sure your doctor is doing what the federal government deems appropriate and cost effective. The goal is to reduce costs and “guide” your doctor’s decisions (442, 446). These provisions in the stimulus bill are virtually identical to what Daschle prescribed in his 2008 book, “Critical: What We Can Do About the Health-Care Crisis.” According to Daschle, doctors have to give up autonomy and “learn to operate less like solo practitioners.”

[…]

Hospitals and doctors that are not “meaningful users” of the new system will face penalties. “Meaningful user” isn’t defined in the bill. That will be left to the HHS secretary, who will be empowered to impose “more stringent measures of meaningful use over time” (511, 518, 540-541)

What penalties will deter your doctor from going beyond the electronically delivered protocols when your condition is atypical or you need an experimental treatment? The vagueness is intentional. In his book, Daschle proposed an appointed body with vast powers to make the “tough” decisions elected politicians won’t make.

[…]

Hiding health legislation in a stimulus bill is intentional. Daschle supported the Clinton administration’s health-care overhaul in 1994, and attributed its failure to debate and delay. A year ago, Daschle wrote that the next president should act quickly before critics mount an opposition. “If that means attaching a health-care plan to the federal budget, so be it,” he said. “The issue is too important to be stalled by Senate protocol.”

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Japan faces 'unimaginable' contraction


http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto020920091358127080

Japan's economy faces an "unimaginable" contraction, the chief economist of its central bank warned on Monday, as figures revealed surging bankruptcies and a big fall in machinery orders.

The warning from Kazuo Momma, head of the Bank of Japan's research and statistics department, underscored the gloom surrounding the world's second-largest economy as export orders dry up, companies shut down production lines and consumers stop spending.

Japan, where industrial output plunged a record 9.6 per cent month on month in December, is due to announce fourth-quarter gross domestic product data next week. Polls of economists suggest GDP will have fallen more than 3 per cent compared with the previous quarter - an annualised decline of more than 10 per cent.

"From October to December the scale of negative growth [in GDP] may have been unimaginable - and we have to consider the possibility that there could be even greater decline between January and March," Mr Momma said in a speech on Monday.

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Monday, February 09, 2009

Bailing Out the Bailouters


We're running out of buckets to bail with.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/financetopics/financialcrisis/4560897/IMF-may-run-out-of-cash-to-fight-crisis-in-six-months-Strauss-Khan-warns.html

Dominique Strauss-Kahn said the [International Monetary] Fund needed an urgent cash infusion if it was to continue bailing out troubled economies in the future. Mr Strauss-Kahn also indicated that the world's advanced economies were now tipping from recession into full-blown depression, cementing fears about the scale of the economic slump in rich nations.


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Krugman Doesn't Understand Recessions


http://globaleconomicanalysis.blogspot.com/2008/12/krugman-still-wrong-after-all-these.html

Back in December, Mish ripped Paul Krugman's discussion of "the hangover theory" of recessions.

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Friday, February 06, 2009

What's Wrong with Fiscal Stimulus?


“We’re all Keynesians now.” Nixon didn’t actually say this, but judging by what is being said these days by many politicians, news outlets, and economic pundits, this mythical assessment certainly seems to be true today. Many have jumped on the fiscal stimulus bandwagon. If we just spend a gazillion dollars we don’t have, we’ll create jobs and kick-start the economy back to life. But how much sense does this make, and why is it that no one seems to count the opportunity costs of such stimulus plans? What will we actually accomplish and will it be relevant? For now we’ll bypass the question of whether or not the government has the authority and responsibility to spend taxpayer money for economic stimulus and just address its consequences.

The first question we should be asking is, “Why are we in a recession in the first place?” This rarely seems to matter to Keynesians who just want to spend money in an attempt to prime the economic pump. References to animal spirits don’t explain anything or alternatively, such references could potentially explain everything (which is just as useless). But if a substantial cause or exacerbating factor of the recession was a prior inflationary bubble fueled by reckless borrowing and spending, it seems rather problematic to attempt to solve this problem with more borrowing and spending.

Moreover, Keynesians usually see deflation and recession as causes to be counteracted or as problems to be fixed. But what if a deflationary recession is the cure/fix? What if a recession were the market’s attempt to clear itself of credit-driven overproduction and rebalance misallocated resources? In this case, injecting more fiat money into the economy and/or trying to prime the pump with government spending would fall somewhere between irrelevant action and action that is diametrically opposed to the cure and that prolongs the problem.

In fact, all of this is the case. Easy credit, artificially low interest rates, and leverage helped propel large amounts of ill-advised borrowing/spending, and deflation is precisely what is needed for the market to rebalance after such an inflationary binge. A recession is simply the way in which the market purges itself of a general overproduction of goods and fixes the prior misallocation of resources. At best, fiscal stimulus is an irrelevant waste of money that will probably pump up a few consumption-dominated statistics (e.g., GDP) for a while. But more often than not, such stimulus also involves an attempt to fight a symptom and in so doing, it actually retards the cure.

We have been on a debt-fueled binge for years and it is no longer sustainable. The last thing we need is the government to step in where the private sector left off and continue the same binge with new debt of its own. People need to start saving money so that future investments will be backed by capital we have actually accumulated instead of being based on debt and leverage. The market needs to liquidate inflationary bubbles and re-balance misallocations. These aims are not furthered when the government tries to blow new bubbles thus creating new misallocations. As far as recessions are concerned, fiscal stimulus spending is a complete non sequitur.

There is also the general problem of what Jim Rogers refers to as transferring capital and assets “from the competent to the incompetent” and the inefficiencies and economic drag that this creates. Depressed sectors are depressed for a reason. Failing companies are failing for good reasons. When we take money from the economy at large (either through tax changes, borrowing, or inflation) and give in to the “troubled” parts of the economy, we are directly contravening an important and necessary aspect of capitalism: the liquidation of poor/failed ventures for the benefit of good/thriving ventures. This inversion of market forces adds a long-term depressive aspect to the economy instead of a stimulative one. We get more of what we subsidize and less of what we tax.

The second big question we should be asking ourselves is, “Where will the federal government get the stimulus money from?” What follows is an analysis of the alternative sources.

1. Raise taxes, borrow from loaned up banks, borrow from banks w/ excess reserves that they will not part with; borrow from the private sector

This simply takes money from circulation and redistributes it. It therefore adds no new spending/stimulus. The government simply redirects the money into investments that were less valued by the market (otherwise the market would have already spent the money on those investments). Investors would have directed the money towards other sectors and investments but the government stepped in and redistributed that money elsewhere. This lowers prices in the sectors where the money would have been spent thus depriving some sellers in these sectors while it bids up prices in the sectors where the money is actually spent thus pricing the marginal buyers in these sectors out of the market. This adds a layer of inefficiency and distorts the market. Such an effect is especially problematic in a recession because sectors need to rebalance (some more than others) in order to clear gluts and malinvestments. The bottom line here is that some sectors receive a short-term, debt-fueled boost, some sectors pay the price via a short term drag, and resources are poorly allocated.

In addition, money borrowed on the market will add a new and large bidder to the capital markets thus raising interest rates above what they would have been w/o this extra bidder. The private borrowers at the margin are priced out; they don’t get the funds they need and suffer economic loss because of this. Others will pay more to borrow funds thus increasing their costs (and leading to an increase in their prices) and lowering their return. Some people will get economic stimulus while others will pay the price. On the other hand, tax increases will add a new burden to the whole economy thus adding a depressive aspect to the useless redistributive aspect.

2. Monetize debt by borrowing from the Fed

This adds new money to the economy (i.e., inflation). This new money will bid up prices in the sectors to be stimulated. Marginal buyers of these sectors will be priced out of the market and suffer economic loss. As the new money flows throughout the economy, it pushes prices higher than they otherwise would have been (keep in mind that this could take the form of stable prices when, in the absence of the new money, prices would and should be falling). Those who get the new money early get the benefit of the pre-inflation prices while those who get the new money later will pay more for the goods/services they buy than they would have paid. Those on fixed incomes are victimized the most as their purchasing power is looted and redistributed. The economy eventually has more money but prices are also higher than they would have been.

This increase in prices includes the price of credit. When lenders find out that the government is monetizing debt, interest rates will rise (or fall less than they would have fallen in the absence of the new money) so that lenders can protect themselves from the anticipated inflation. The marginal private borrower will be priced out of the market while other borrowers will pay more for credit thus lowering their overall rate of return and pressuring them to raise prices. If the Fed tried to counteract upward pressure on interest rates by buying a significant amount of treasuries from the market, this would artificially balance the credit markets but it would create new problems (e.g., interest rates that are held lower than they would be based on non-manipulated credit market conditions and a manipulated money supply would further the same easy credit binge that brought us this mess). More manipulation doesn’t eliminate policy costs, it simply shifts them around so that they reemerge in a different place and/or form.

3. Borrowing from commercial banks w/ excess reserves where the banks allow reserves to fall

This would seem like a remote possibility. All other things being equal, new government borrowing should not induce banks to lower their reserves. If they have substantial excess reserves, they must have good reasons for it (like a financial crisis perhaps). Government borrowing shouldn’t change those reasons. Nevertheless, under this situation, new money would be added to the economy and the effects would be similar to those produced by government borrowing from the Fed.

4. Tax cuts as direct stimulus

This would be much less problematic than the previous options if done the right way. For example, rebates are no different from stimulus checks. They are one time or short-term payments that don’t provide the sustained improvement that is necessary. And because they are indiscriminate transfer payments, they don’t do what tax cuts are meant to do: lower the burden on productivity and encourage work. Tax reductions must therefore take the form of sustained marginal rate cuts on labor, capital, and business activity.

However, the Laffer curve not withstanding, this would still be no silver bullet. It would be helpful for removing some of the burden on the economy but tax cuts don’t and can’t address the cause of the problem: the prior inflationary boom which resulted in overproduction, debt accumulation, and misallocation of resources. Tax cuts lower one of the burdensome constants of the equation but they don’t address the variable part of the equation: the boom and bust cycle itself. Taxes in the US are far too high. They should be lowered, but this doesn’t have anything to do with the business cycle.

5. Sell federal land

This would require the sale of a massive number of acres – a move that would significantly depress land prices in an already depressed market (this assumes the government could even move enough of this “product” to raise a significant amount of funds). It would also take far too much time to implement. While a theoretical possibility, it is never a serious option.

Now that we’ve reviewed some important short and medium term effects of the various options that the government has for raising money, we should mention the primary long term effect that results from most of those options. Any borrowing along with tax cuts will add to the public debt, a burden that will eventually need to be repaid by someone. Since government debt is almost never repaid in short order (i.e., 1-5 years), this amounts to a tax on future taxpayers to pay for the indulgences and mistakes of current taxpayers. The two groups will have substantial overlap for a decade or two but some future taxpayers will be paying a bill they never helped run up. This is stealing from the future to pay for the present, and the longer the debt is held, the greater the amount of money that will be stolen from future victims to pay off the currently generated debt.

Moreover, these future payments on the debt will burden the economy by diverting resources. Instead of producing and buying useful goods/services, these future payments will go to pay down the glutinous national credit card bill.

This debt adds an additional cost in the form of interest. Some claim that the new debt we are now accruing is not much of a problem in this regard because current interest rates are so low. This is true now but the potential for a significant problem in the not too distant future is large. It is almost surely the case that the government will not run significant budget surpluses in the near future. This means the new debt, along with the old, will need to be rolled over. As interest rates rise, this will add billions of dollars to the cost of servicing the debt at the same time that entitlement costs will be rising substantially. If we have a $15 trillion debt that starts to roll over into bonds costing 8-12%, the phrase “international debt crisis of the 1980s” may start to show up in more and more news articles. If we think our budget is being mismanaged now, wait until yearly debt servicing payments push past $1 trillion.

The bottom line here is economics 101: there ain’t no such thing as a free lunch. In order to raise new money for a fiscal stimulus plan, the government can deficit finance by borrowing, deficit finance by cutting taxes, raise taxes, or inflate. All of these actions (with the partial exception of intelligent tax rate cuts) cause numerous market-distorting, debt-accumulating problems, have limited and questionable benefits, and are irrelevant or even exacerbating when it comes to the real problem. We got here by way of distorted credit markets, debt, leverage, and a lack of saving. Even if we manage to manipulate some consumption-dominated statistics for a while, we’re not going to solve the problem with more of the same.

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Monday, February 02, 2009

Banana Capitalism?


http://finance.yahoo.com/tech-ticker/article/166389/Hybrid-or-Hydra-Meet-the-New-Bailout-Same-as-the-Old-Bailout

Blodget and Task are right. The irresponsible banks can be restructured or liquidated in an orderly manner without mugging the taxpayers. Shockingly enough, this would require the debt and equity holders to actually accept the consequences of the choices they made. But pretty much all of the talk so far regarding bailout part deux, like TARP, involves taxpayers taking risks and/or losses so that the banks, their equity holders, and their debt holders can escape those consequences or possibly even make money (e.g., bonuses given out by banks currently at the public trough). The gains are privatized while the losses are socialized. What is the economic equivalent of a banana republic?

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